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SUPERMARKET LIABILITY: PROBLEMS IN PROVING THE
SLIP-AND-FALL CASE IN FLORIDA
The past decade has brought a noticeable increase in tort litigation involving Florida supermarkets. Some of this increase may
be attributed to the growing concept of products liability,' but by
far the greatest number of cases have arisen out of the slip-and-fall
accident. These cases usually arise when an invitee shopping for his
groceries slips on a "foreign" substance, such as a lettuce leaf or a
green bean. The resulting fall produces the injuries for which action
is brought.
A plaintiff injured in a slip-and-fall accident has several avenues
available for establishing the supermarket's liability. A cursory view
of these avenues would lead one to believe that recovery for injuries
sustained is virtually assured. Further, absent contributory negligence,
the injuries received would seem to merit compensation. Closer study,
however, reveals that there are almost insurmountable burdens of
proof blocking each avenue. These burdens and the practical problems in meeting them are the subject of this note. The emphasis
will be on Florida law, but the decisions of other jurisdictions will
be compared on many of the issues.
THE AVENUES OF PROOF

Generally, the duty of a supermarket owner is the same as that
of any store or property owner, that is, a business-invitee may expect
that the premises will be maintained in a reasonably safe condition.2
Although this involves a positive duty, the supermarket owner is
clearly not the insurer of his shoppers' safety. 3 He may be held liable
4
only for breach of his duty to exercise reasonable care.
With the rule of reasonable care as a foundation, the courts have
held that the duty of a supermarket owner not only involves care that
dangerous conditions are not created by him or his employees 5 and
care that dangerous conditions once discovered are quickly remedied6
but also, that reasonable inspections be made to discover dangerous
conditions that may exist through no fault of the owner or his
1. See Note, Products Liability: Doctrinal Problems and the Restatement's
Answer, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 421, 430 (1964).
2. Matson v. Tip Top Grocery Co., Inc., 151 Fla. 247, 9 So. 2d 366 (1942).
3. See Frederich's Mkt., Inc. v. Knox, 66 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1953).
4. See Matson v. Tip Top Grocery, Inc., 151 Fla. 247, 9 So. 2d 366 (1942).
5. See Pogue v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957); Food
Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1961).
6. See Berube v. Economy Grocery Stores Corp., 315 Mass. 89, 51 N.E.2d 777
(1943).
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servants.7 Conversely, the courts have held that a supermarket owner
may be held liable only if he or his employees created the dangerous
condition or if actual or constructive knowledge of the condition can
be shown.8
In outline form, the avenues of proof in supermarket slip-and-fall
cases are the following:
(1) that the owner or his employees or agents created the
dangerous condition, or
(2) that the owner or his employees or agents had actual notice
of the dangerous condition and sufficient time in which to remedy
it, or
(3)that the condition existed long enough to have been discovered and remedied (constructive notice).
These are the same avenues of proof that govern the entire area of
property-owner or occupier liability to business-invitees (of which
the supermarket is but a particular instance).9
A HIGHER DEGREE OF CARE
The late Justice Terrell, in several noteworthy opinions, expressed
the viewpoint that the supermarket is a unique store or business
property necessitating different rules of conduct than other related
enterprises. The first of his opinions occurs in a racetrack liability
case, but the implications of his reasoning extend into the supermarket setting. Cases from other backgrounds are sometimes cited
because of the similarity of the burden of proof with that in supermarket liability.
In Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club,o the plaintiff stepped on an
empty bottle in an exit aisle of the racetrack and suffered injuries in
the resulting fall. The defendant contended that the evidence failed
to show a sufficient time had elapsed for the owners, in the exercise
of reasonable care, to have found and removed the particular bottle
in question. For the plaintiff to carry this burden of proof would
have been a virtual impossibility. The court, however, felt that a
higher degree of diligence rather than reasonable care, was required
of such an establishment. Justice Terrell, speaking for the court,
wrote: "[R]easonable care as applied to a race track requires a higher
7. See Jenkins v. Brackin, 171 So. 2d 589 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
8. Carls Mkts., Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1953).
9. See Messner v: Webb's City, Inc., 62 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1952); F. W. Woolworth
Co. v. Stevens, 154 So. 2d 201 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); Pentecost v. Ansan Corp., 136
So. 2d 667 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962); City of Tampa v. Johnson, 114 So. 2d 807 (2d

D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
10. 35 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1948).
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degree of diligence than it does when applied to a store, bank or
such like place of business." ' As a result, whether this higher degree
of diligence was breached by the proprietors when they allowed the
exit aisles to become bottle-littered was held to be a jury question.
In effect, the burden of proof was lightened so that the plaintiff could
reach the jury.
The implications that the Wells opinion held for supermarket
slip-and-fall cases were made clear in Carl's Markets, Inc. v. De Feo.'2
A husband and wife sued the defendant supermarket for injuries
sustained by the wife when she had slipped on a string bean while
shopping. The evidence showed the supermarket floor had been
swept about fifteen minutes before the accident, that the defendant
had no actual knowledge of the presence of the bean on the floor,
and that there was no direct proof of the length of time the dangerous
substance had remained on the defendant's floor. The plaintiff
proved that the vegetable bins had been overfilled, and it was admitted that the bean might have been on the floor at least fifteen
minutes during a busy time of the day. On this evidence the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff in a per curiam
decision.
Justice Terrell's concurring opinion pointed out the differences
between the old-time grocery, with its obvious perils and its untidy
atmosphere that warned all to be on guard, and the modern selfservice supermarket of today. He urged that "rules of conduct governing a business are not rules of statute that the legislature is expected
to promulgate, they are rules of reason that emanate from the court
and which the court is expected to keep current."' 3 As an example
of proper up-dating of a rule of conduct, the opinion cited Wells and
drew the conclusion that "something more specific than the reasonable care rule must be imposed on the proprietor of the self serving
14
grocery store."'
The Wells and De Feo opinions were used by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Pogue v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company"
as the basis for "a new and different rule of care to be imposed on
the proprietor of a modern, self-service grocery store."' 6 In Pogue the
plaintiff, a woman seventy years of age, entered the defendant's supermarket and headed toward an unused checkout counter. Halfway
across the entrance aisle the plaintiff slipped, on lettuce and carrot
tops, and fell. The plaintiff conceded that no evidence was available as
11. Id. at 721.
12. 55 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1951).
13. Id. at 185.

14.
15.
16.

Ibid.
242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957).
Id. at 581.
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to actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. She
argued, however, that she could base her case on evidence tending
to show that the storekeeper, by his method of operation, had created
a dangerous condition that caused the presence of the foreign matter
on the floor. The court reversed a summary judgment for the defendant largely because it interpreted the Florida law as tending toward
greater storekeeper liability.
The Florida Supreme Court, in Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell,7
corrected this "misinterpretation" of Florida law by the federal court.
Trusell refuted the notion that Florida had moved toward more
"storekeeper" liability. According to the court, the concept of a
"higher degree of diligence," which had been expressed most clearly
in Wells, had only been given a tentative acceptance in one avenue
of proof - when the defendant is the creator of the dangerous condition; and even this limited acceptance is found only in dictum.' s
Since Trusell, the Florida courts have consistently applied the rule
of reasonable care to all supermarket slip-and-fall cases. The results
of this application will next be considered.
PROBLEMS IN PROOF

PreliminaryEvidentiary Problems
The plaintiff, in a slip-and-fall case, must first establish that the
slip and fall, in fact, was caused by the existence of a dangerous condition on the premises of the defendant. Three matters of proof,
therefore, are (1) existence of the condition, (2) its dangerous nature,
and (3) causation in fact. The proof of all three are necessary for
recovery but are not alone sufficient to prove the whole case. After
proof of these matters the plaintiff must follow one of the avenues
of proof.19
Proof of these three essentials is severely hampered in most cases
because of the lack of disinterested witnesses. Often, the plaintiff
is the only witness to the fall or the object causing it.20 When the
plaintiff is able to find a witness to the fall, it is usually a husband or
a wife who is naturally a party interested in the plaintiff's case. Moreover, a husband who has witnessed his wife's injury will often join
2
in the suit. 1
17. 131 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1961).
18. Carls Mkts., Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1953).
19. See Kroger Grocery & Bakery Co. v. Dempsey, 201 Ark. 71, 143 S.W.2d
564 (1940).
20. See Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc. v. Patty, 109 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1959);
Carls Mkts., v. Leonard, 73 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1954).
21. See Carls Mkts., Inc. v. De Feo, 55 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1951); Grand Union
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Griffin, 156 So. 2d 789 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1963).
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When the plaintiff seeks the aid of store employees in finding the
object causing the fall, he is liable to find their eyesight poor.2 2 And
when an employee is called to testify, he is apt to be certain that no
foreign matter was at or near the place of the mishap, even though
disinterested witnesses may have testified otherwise.23 In any event,
the employees are probably the only ones who have carefully inspected
the scene of the accident immediately following its occurrence. Other
witnesses, shoppers not attuned to such details, normally have little
knowledge of the conditions except at some vaguely-remembered
time before or after the accident.
The nature of the foreign substance itself makes the proof of
these preliminary matters difficult- green beans, lettuce leaves, carrot tops, and pieces of spinach are highly movable objects. It is not
nearly as difficult to prove the existence and dangerous nature of a
rotten tree 24 or of a rusted manhole cover 25 as it is to prove that water
and vegetable leaves existed and created a dangerous condition on
the floor of the defendant's supermarket. Even if the evidence sufficiently proved that a generally dangerous condition existed on the
floor, the court could require proof that the condition existed at the
particular spot of the plaintiff's fall and was the cause of it.26
As long as the condition complained of is food particles or other
foreign substances the courts, it would be fair to say, have little difficulty in finding them to be dangerous. It must be noted, however,
that the plaintiff can prove too much by testifying to the dangerous
nature of the condition that caused the slip and fall. In Carl's
Market v. Leonard27 the plaintiff slipped and fell on a piece of wax
paper in the defendant's food market. She admitted on the witness
stand that the floor was terrazzo "which is very slippery on something
like that [piece of wax paper]." 28 Instead of considering this state-

ment merely as proof of the dangerous nature of the condition, the
court found contributory negligence on the basis of it.
Creation of the DangerousCondition
A case-by-case approach will best illustrate the particular problems
in proving supermarket liability within each of the three avenues of
proof. The starting point for discussion of the first avenue, creation
of the dangerous condition, is Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club. -9
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Messner v. Webb's City, Inc. 62 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1952).
See Carls Mkts., Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1953).
City of Jacksonville v. Foster, 41 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1949).
City of Tampa v. Johnson, 114 So. 2d 807 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
Haley v. Harvey Bldg., Inc., 168 So. 2d 330 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
73 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1954).
Id. at 827.
35 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1948).
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In Wells the plaintiff proved only what he himself was able, as a
business-invitee on the defendant's racetrack premises, to witness that the exit aisles were littered with bottles, that the defendant sold
beverages in bottles, and that patrons were permitted to set the
empty bottles anywhere they pleased. The proof, in effect, was of
the defendant's standard operating procedures. The Florida Supreme
Court found this sufficient to take the case to the jury on the issue of
negligence.
The Wells decision is revealing for another reason. We may note
the matters on which proof was not required. No evidence was introduced to prove either constructive or actual notice of the bottle which
caused the slip and fall. No evidence was introduced to prove that
the defendant or one of his employees was the person who placed
the particular bottle in the exit aisle nor that they had, at anytime,
placed bottles in the aisle. These matters would undoubtedly have
been impossible of proof had they been required.
On closely analogous facts, but this time in a supermarket setting,
the Florida Supreme Court apparently required the proof of one or
more of these impossibilities in Marks v. Carl's Markets, Inc. 30 The
court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant in a per curiam
decision; the facts are stated in a dissenting opinion:3 1
The record discloses that appellee's place of business was
a very attractive supermarket, that at the time plaintiff was
hurt, there was a "special" on green beans, that the bean bin
was overloaded, that it was difficult to take beans from the
bin, without dropping some on the floor, and that beans were
in fact repeatedly dropped on the floor, and not restored to
the bin. There was testimony that the floor had not been
swept for more than an hour at the time plaintiff slipped on
the bean and fell.
Clearly, negligent operating procedures were shown, but questions of
negligence were not permitted to go to the jury.
The federal court, as mentioned above, was not as slow to apply
the Wells reasoning to Florida supermarkets. 32 The "uncontroverted
facts" of Pogue do not vary from the pattern outlined in Wells and
33
Marks although the details differ.
Fresh vegetables, including lettuce and carrots were not packaged, and pieces of such vegetables frequently broke off in the
baskets and remained there after the purchases had been re30.
31.
32.
33.

62 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1953).

Id. at 740.
Pogue v. Great At. &Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957).

Id. at 577. (Emphasis added.)
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moved [at the checkout counter] .

. .

. As they were pushed

[often by employees of the defendant] out into the main entrance aisle, the baskets often bumped into and against other
baskets which had accumulated there. The bumping together
of the baskets frequently caused pieces of vegetables remaining
therein to fall onto the floor of the main entrance aisle. As
a result of the customary operations of the defendant, the aisle
was often littered with such pieces of vegetables.
The court held that the evidence was relevant to the issue of negligence under an expanded definition of creation of a dangerous condition. The Wells definition of duty was applied to the supermarket
situation.
There is an additional reason for the result in Pogue, a reason
that illuminates another problem in proving supermarket liability in
Florida. The defendant argued that there was not sufficient circumstantial evidence to justify submission of the case to the jury. This
contention was based upon the often-followed Florida rule that, in
order for circumstantial evidence to be submitted to the jury, one
inference must outweigh all other reasonable inferences from such
evidence. 34 Holding that the rule was merely procedural, the court
refused to apply it. Instead, the court felt that fair-minded men
could draw the favorable inference in this instance and, therefore,
submitted the evidence to a jury.
Circumstantial evidence plays a large part in each of the avenues
of proof, but plaintiffs attempting to prove the defendant's creation
of a dangerous condition are particularly dependent on this type of
evidence. Short of seeing the defendant place a particular bean on
the floor, there is usually little direct evidence that the particular
bean or lettuce leaf arrived at its resting place through the acts of
the defendant or his employees. From the evidence presented, the
inference can always be drawn that the bean did not come from the
defendant's bins or that, even if it did, a person not under the control or in the employ of the defendant was solely responsible for its
present position. In such a situation, only a Solomon could determine
when one inference outweighs all other reasonable ones. The Florida
courts, however, stand ready to make this determination. Two Florida
cases illustrate the courts' application of the rules regarding circumstantial evidence.
The plaintiff, in Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc. v. Moroni,35
sought to prove that the dangerous condition was created by the defendant's employees. The slip and fall was caused by a piece of wet
34.
35.

King v. Weis-Patterson Lumber Co., 124 Fla. 272, 168 So. 858 (1936).
113 So. 2d 275 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
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spinach, which was on the floor by the dairy stall some distance from
the vegetable bins. The evidence showed the operating procedures of
the store in detail. The court summarized the evidence as follows:
vegetables were washed and trimmed in the rear of the store; they
were then hurriedly carted through the store aisles, past the dairy
stall, in open containers on four wheeled, flat-bed trucks; ice was
supplied to the bins in like manner in any available container; wilted
vegetables were returned to the rear of the store, retrimmed, and then
returned to the bin; the route of these operations was directly over
the spot of the fall; there were standing instructions that the floor be
swept every hour; and when vegetables were sold they were immediately packaged in a paper bag and sealed by stapling in the immediate
area of the bin. On this evidence, the court ruled that the jury could
properly infer the defendant's employees had created the dangerous
condition. Presumably, the court found the evidence was capable of
producing an initial inference that would outweigh all other reasonable inferences.
In Food FairStores, Inc. v. Trusell,36 the question presented was
whether "statements contained in an affidavit filed in opposition to a
motion for a summary judgment constituted admissable circumstantial
evidence which would have justified a jury inference of negligence." 37
The district court had held that the following statements warranted
reversal of a summary judgment entered for the defendant in the
38
trial court:
[]agboys would take the unloaded shopping buggies from the
"checkout" counter and stack them between the "checkout"
counter and the drug department. Further, that the bagboys
were supposed to empty the buggies of paper, debris, loose
particles of vegetables or greens before stacking the buggies.
Further, that in the course of work, the bagboys would not
always accomplish this, and that sometimes loose leaves would
fall from the buggies to the floor, being shaken loose by the
stacking process.
The supreme court held that the statement was not relevant to the
issue of negligence and, therefore, would not have been admissible
at trial. According to the court, the evidence was purely speculative
and "inadequate to produce an inference that outweighs all contrary
or opposing inferences." 39 Then the court added a comment that
seems curious at best. It found the evidence insufficient in that it
36. 131 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1961).
37. Id. at 731.

38. Id. at 732.
39. Id. at 733.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol18/iss3/4

8

Carroll:
Supermarket
Liability:LAW
Problems
in Proving the Slip-and-Fall Case
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
REVIEW
[Vol. XVIII

"does not even purport to be descriptive of a consistent, established
course of conduct by employees of the store.- 40 Whether the statements in Moroni do describe a "consistent, established course of conduct by employees of the store" is not immediately clear. The evidence in Moroni seemingly has a greater particularity than the statements in Trusell, but query: Could not this difference be due to the
nature of the respective operations? In other words, did not the
plaintiff "prove" all that he possibly could in each instance?
Actual Notice of the DangerousCondition
Actual notice, the second distinct avenue of proof open to the injured plaintiff, is proved by evidence that the defendant or his employees were aware of the dangerous condition in time to remedy it.
Direct evidence of actual notice is usually in the form of an admission by an employee or the defendant that he had, prior to the
accident, noticed the dangerous condition. Such an admission has
been held admissable as an exception to the hearsay rule in Florida. 41
When direct evidence of notice is introduced, the plaintiff still
must prove that the notice was received in time for remedial steps to
have been taken. The period of time itself, the capacity of the
noticing person, 42 whether a bagboy or cashier, and the extent of the
efforts by this person to remedy the condition 4 3 have a bearing on
this matter of proof.
Because of the difficulty in obtaining the necessary admissions,
circumstantial evidence is usually relied upon to prove actual notice.
The use of circumstantial evidence in Florida, of course, again introduces the problem of weighing conflicting inferences. For this reason
alone it is not surprising that there are no such cases reported in
Florida. In other jurisdictions, however, cases concerning the proof
of actual notice through circumstantial evidence are reported, and
three are discussed below.
In Hewitt v. Katz Drug Co. 44 the plaintiff proved that an hour
before the accident the defendant's manager told an employee to clean
up the aisle in which the plaintiff fell. The court felt that the jury
could properly infer it was the presence of the dangerous condition on
the floor that motivated the manager's action.
In Smith v. Manning's, Inc.,45 the plaintiff testified that the floor
40. Ibid.
41. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Rosenquist, 112 So. 2d 885 (2d D.CA. Fla.
1959).
42. Bader v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 112 N.J.L. 241, 169 At. 687 (1934).
43. Winsby v. Kirtell, 10 Cal. App. 2d 61, 50 P.2d 1075 (1935).
44. 199 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. App. 1947).
45. 13 Wash. 2d 573, 126 P.2d 44 (1942).
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where she fell was littered with matches and cigarette butts. None
of the employees could say that the floor was swept on the morning of
the accident. In holding that the defendant had notice, the court
pointed out that at the time of the accident one of the employees
was in the aisle where plaintiff fell, and was responsible for keeping
the aisle clean. Further, the court noted that it must have taken
considerable time for the refuse to accumulate on the floor.
The courts have not always found circumstancial evidence of
actual notice sufficient. In Morris v. King Cole Stores, Inc.46 the
plaintiff proved that an employee, only minutes before the accident,
passed over the spot where the plaintiff fell. The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that actual notice could be inferred because the
employee could reasonably have been expected to see the dangerous
condition.
The case above is one of the comparatively few cases dealing explicitly with the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence of actual notice.
Because of the similarity of such evidence to that which is necessary for proof of constructive notice, the courts tend to discuss evidence of actual and constructive notice together. Many of the cases
discussed in the following section, therefore, have application to actual
as well as to constructive notice.
ConstructiveNotice of the DangerousCondition
The proof of constructive notice is the proof of a time factor. The
plaintiff must show that the dangerous condition existed for a period
of time sufficient for it to have been discovered and remedied. The
sufficiency of the time period depends on many elements. The Maryland Court of Appeals enumerated the following circumstances that
should be considered:47
(1)
(2)
(3)
-(4)
(5)

the nature of the danger,
the number of persons likely to be affected by it,
the diligence required to discover or prevent it,
the opportunity and means of knowledge,
the foresight which a man of ordinary care and prudence
would be expected to exercise under the circumstances,
(6) the foreseeable consequences of the conditions.

A different list was suggested by the Minnesota Supreme Court:48

46. 132 Conn. 489, 45 A.2d 710 (1946).
47. Moore v. American Stores Co., 169 Md. 541, 182 Ad. 436 (1936).
48. Hubbard v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 221 Minn. 133, 21 N.W.2d 229

(1945).
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

the
the
the
the
the

nature of the business,
size of the store,
number of customers,
nature of the dangerous substance,
location of the substance.

Although there may be disagreement as to which factors will determine a sufficient length of time, the courts have agreed that an ex49
tremely short period of time, such as not more than four minutes,
will not qualify as constructive notice. On the other hand, periods
such as two hours, 50 one hour,5' and twelve to thirty minutes 5 2 have
been held sufficient. Most courts have held that the question of
53
sufficiency should be left to the jury.
Generally, many types of evidence have been offered in proof
or disproof of the time factor. Several distinct types are: evidence
of the actions of store employees,5 4 evidence of the physical appearance of the dangerous condition itself, and evidence of prior witnessing of the condition 6 or of prior accidents.57 These categories of
evidence and others have met with varied acceptance. In Florida,
particularly, there is uncertainty as to which type of evidence or
which combination of evidence is necessary to prove the time factor.
The Florida Supreme Court decision in Miami Shores Village v.
Lingler8 indicates that evidence of the physical appearance of the
condition is admissible as proof of constructive notice. The case did
not arise in a supermarket setting, however. The plaintiff, while
walking on a city sidewalk, had tripped over dangerously-exposed
reinforcing rods of a concrete parking bumper. In his suit against
the city, the plaintiff showed that the bumper was discolored and
weathered. The court held this evidence a sufficient basis for the

49. Shea v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 63 R.I. 85, 7 A.2d 196 (1939).
50.

Dillon v. Wallace, 148 Cal. App. 2d 447, 306 P.2d 1044 (1957).

51. White v. Mugar, 280 Mass. 73, 181 N.E. 725 (1932).
52. Hale v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 2d 124, 276 P.2d 118 (1954).
53. See Danisan v. Cardinal Grocery Stores, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 2d 833, 318
P.2d 681 (1957); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Peet, 132 Colo. 11, 284 P.2d 659 (1955).
54. E.g., Jenkins v. Brackin, 171 So. 2d 589 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Stevens, 154 So. 2d 201 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); Taylor v. J. M. McDonald Co., 156 Neb. 437, 56 N.W.2d 610 (1953).

55. See Smail v. Jordan Marsh Co., 309 Mass. 386, 35 N.E.2d 221 (1941);
Messner v. Red Owl Stores, 238 Minn. 441, 57 N.W.2d 659 (1953).
56. E.g., Haley v. Harvey Bldg., Inc., 168 So. 2d 330 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964);
White v. Mugar, 280 Mass. 73, 181 N.E. 725 (1932); Bader v. Great At. 9: Pac.
Tea Co., 112 N.J.L. 241, 169 Atl. 687 (1934).
57. E.g., Carls Mkts., Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1953); Moore v.
American Stores Co., 169 Md. 541, 182 Atl. 436 (1936).
58. 157 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1963).
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jury's finding of constructive notice. An earlier case 59 in which evidence of the decayed condition of a tree was deemed sufficient to
establish constructive notice of its dangerous condition was relied upon by the court.
These cases, while analogous in certain respects, cannot be deemed
conclusive on the sufficiency of similar evidence in a supermarket
slip-and-fall case. It must be noted that there was no question of
"ownership" of the condition in these cases as there is in the supermarket context. In supermarket cases it is when ownership of the
dangerous object cannot be proved that the plaintiff must rely on
constructive notice. Therefore, the mere showing of discoloration
or weathering may not raise as strong a favorable inference as it
would in cases such as Lingler.
The courts of other jurisdictions have considered the issue of what
inferences may properly be drawn from the condition of the foreign
matter itself. There seems to be no generally accepted majority position. Some cases are included as illustrations of the reasoning and
facts involved in the decisions.
In two Alabama cases,60 evidence that a lettuce leaf was dirty,
crumpled, and mashed was held to be sufficient for a jury's determination of constructive notice. A Connecticut court ruled the same
on testimony by the plaintiff that there was present on the floor "a
lot of sort of crushed strawberries" and "it looked like lettuce leaves,
all spread out, kind of dirty... as though several people stepped on
it before." 61 A Massachusetts opinion held that "dirty and grimy"
squash shavings and seeds, which covered about a foot of floor area,
could properly be found to have existed long enough to constitute
2
constructive notice.6
On the other hand, testimony by the plaintiff that a vegetable
leaf was dirty was held not to be sufficient in a Georgia case. 63 Even
the combination of dirtiness and dryness was not enough for the
Connecticut court in a case involving the skin of a frankfurter in a
store where frankfurters were sold.64 And, in an Ohio decision, evidence that a banana peel was dark in color and contained grit from
the floor was insufficient because it is a "matter of common knowledge" that bananas are often black when pulled off the bunch.65 The
59. City of Jacksonville v. Foster, 41 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1949).
60. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Weems, 266 Ala. 415, 96 So. 2d 741 (1957);
Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Popkins, 260 Ala. 97, 69 So. 2d 274 (1953).
61. Morris v. King Cole Stores, Inc., 132 Conn. 489, 45 A.2d 710 (1946).
62. Berube v. Economy Grocery Stores Corp., 315 Mass. 89, 51 N.E.2d 777
(1943).
63. Miscally v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 68 Ga. App. 729, 23 S.E.2d 860 (1943).
64. Edwards v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 129 Conn. 245, 27 A.2d 163 (1943).
65. Zerbe v. City of Springfield, 381 Ohio L. Abs. 487, 60 N.E.2d 793 (1943).
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flattened and gritty appearance of the banana peel was of no aid,
the court said, because it could have been caused by the plaintiff's
fall or by another person only moments before. Finally, in a Minnesota case, the court commented that the natural deteriorated condition alone was not sufficient, but that the result may have been
66
different if the object had been pressed down, dirty, or torn.
It is obvious that, in the absence of a Florida case on point, a
plaintiff in this state would hesitate to base his proof of constructive notice of the dangerous condition solely on the physical condition
of the foreign substance itself. On the other hand, a plaintiff could
draw some encouragement from Lingler as well as the fact that the
Florida appellate courts have not ruled as a matter of law that such
evidence is insufficient.
What other evidence has been held sufficient for the jury on the
issue of constructive notice? One of the few Florida cases to deal explicitly with the sufficiency of the evidence of constructive notice in
the supermarket context is Jenkins v. Brackin.67 There, the plaintiff
slipped on a string bean on the floor of the defendant's store. The
evidence revealed that the plaintiff and her husband were the only
customers in the store at the time of the accident and that there had
been no other customers in the store during the fifteen or twenty
minutes preceding the plaintiff's fall. The only others in the store
were the defendant-owner, an employee behind the meat counter,
and a fourteen-year-old helper whose job it was to sweep the floor
when it was dirty. The evidence revealed a conflict as to the time
of the accident, yet the trial court granted a summary judgment for
the defendant.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the time of the accident was
a material fact and therefore summary judgment was improper because a reasonable inference could be made as to the length of time
the bean was on the floor. The basis for this contention was an affidavit of the fourteen-year-old helper, which stated that he did not
work on the day of the accident from noon until 4:00 p.m. and that
after his return at 4:00 p.m. he did not sweep the floor nor did he see
anyone else sweep it until after the accident.
The appellate court reversed the lower court and emphasized
that proof of constructive notice, like any fact, may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. Further, the court said: 68
[T]he rule imposing liability on a proprietor of a public
building, on the basis of constructive notice, creates a duty of
making reasonable inspections of the portions of his premises
66. Messner v. Red Owl Stores, 238 Minn. 411, 57 N.W.2d 659 (1953).
67. 171 So. 2d 589 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).

68. Id. at 591.
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that are open to his customers. It follows then that evidence
that no inspection had been made during a particular period
of time prior to an accident 'may warrant an inference that
the dangerous condition existed long enough so that the
exercise of reasonable care would have resulted in discovery.
Finally, the court enumerated the evidence it found sufficient to
warrant a jury's determination whether a reasonable time had elapsed.
This included the fact that there was a period of fifteen to twenty
minutes prior to the accident during which the defendant had not
inspected the area of the fall, the affidavit of the helper, the dispute
over the time of the accident, and the fact that the store was small
but had three employees on the premises.
In F. W. Woolworth Company v. Stevens6 9 the plaintiff fell on a
soapbubble solution in the defendant's store. The plaintiff testified
she had been in the store fifteen or twenty minutes before the accident. During this time, as she slowly progressed down the aisle,
there were no customers between her and the place of the accident.
The defendant claimed the area of the accident was clean five minutes
before the accident. Although not pointing out the avenue of proof
to which this evidence related, the court affirmed a jury verdict for
the plaintiff.
Other Florida decisions dealing with the proof of actual or constructive notice are even less helpful.7 0 The courts often content them-

selves with an unrevealing holding that the decision in Food Fair
Stores of Florida,Inc. v. Patty7 l controls because there is "no evidence"
as to actual or constructive notice. Patty stands for the proposition
that in supermarket slip-and-fall cases the burden is on the plaintiff
to prove the facts necessary to satisfy one of the avenues of proof.
The overworking of this decision as precedent is uninstructive to
future plaintiffs and accentuates the difficulty in proving a slip-andfall case.
Other jurisdictions have been more revealing in this respect. In
Hale v. Safeway Stores, Inc.72 because employees were instructed to
pick up fruit and vegetables in the aisles, the defendant was held to
have been aware of the danger to customers from the presence of
these objects on the floor. The evidence further showed that the place
where the plaintiff fell was swept twelve to thirty minutes before
69. 154 So. 2d 201 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1963).
70. See, e.g., Grand Union Supermarkets, Inc. v. Griffin, 165 So. 2d 789 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1963); Sammons v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc., 118 So. 2d 231 (2d

D.C.A. Fla. 1960); Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc. v. Vallarelli, 101 So. 2d 161 (3d
D.CA. Fla. 1958).
71. 109 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1959).
72. 129 Cal. App. 2d 124, 276 P.2d 118 (1954).
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the accident. On this evidence, the California court held that a jury
question was presented on the issue of constructive notice.
Similar evidence was held to create a jury question in Dillon v.
Wallace,73 another California case. In Dillon, there had been no
inspection for two hours before the accident even though the defendant knew that shoppers put loose vegetables in their carts, and that
these often fell to the floor.
The defendant is sometimes able to counter the plaintiff's evidence
with strong evidence of his own. In Sattler v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 74 the plaintiff showed that the debris on the floor was a

"withered" mustard leaf. The defendant, however, proved that the
cleaning methods used on the premises would make it impossible
for vegetable matter to remain on the floor for more than a minute
or two, thus rebutting any inference of negligence.
Prior witnessing of the dangerous condition by third persons has
often been introduced as evidence of constructive notice. In White
v. Mugar,75 a Massachusetts decision, the evidence indicated that the
dangerous condition, which resulted in injury to plaintiff's mother,
was seen one hour before the accident by the plaintiff. The court
recognized it was conceivable that two different dangers were involved,
but held that a jury was not bound to accept that inference.
Proof of constructive notice, more so than the other two avenues
of proof, is a hodgepodge of miscellaneous items of evidence strung
together through good fortune and necessity. Whatever the plaintiff
overhears as she recovers from her fall, she introduces into evidence.
If the banana is black, that too goes into the case. The manager asks
if any of his stockboys swept the aisle - if one did, at almost anytime,
it is introduced into evidence. From these items and others, which
an imaginative mind can relate to constructive notice, the jury must
determine whether a sufficient time has been proven.
Other Matters of Proof
The issue of proximate causation presents no unique problems in
supermarket slip-and-fall cases. 76 The defendant, of course, usually
affirmatively pleads contributory negligence. The courts have generally reasoned it is not contributory negligence to fail to look for
danger where none is reasonably to be expected.17 Given the spotless
atmosphere of the modern supermarket, the plaintiff is not required
73.
74.
75.
76.
At. &
77.

148 Cal. App. 2d 447, 306 P.2d 1044 (1957).
18 F.R.D. 271 (D.C. La. 1955).
280 Mass. 73, 181 N.E. 725 (1932).
Cf. Goldsmith v. Mills, 130 Cal. App. 2d 493, 279 P.2d 51 (1955); Great
Pac. Tea Co. v. Popkins, 260 Ala. 97, 69 So. 2d 274 (1953).
See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Miami v. Wylie, 46 So. 2d 396 (1950).
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to watch his every step. He has been required, however, to notice
display boxes7 8 and to take some precautions to ascertain the condition
0
of the floor when leaving the meat counter.
CONCLUSION

There can be no doubt that recovery in a supermarket slip-andfall case is a sometime thing. The avenues to recovery are blockaded
at some points, poorly lighted at others, and virtually nonexistent at
still others.
Why should these burdens be placed upon the .plaintiff who is
injured in a supermarket? The answers are not satisfactory. We cannot assume that most slip-and-fall cases are fraudulent. Nor can we
believe that most shoppers are careless. Most certainly, we cannot
proclaim that the burden of proof must be what it is because the
supermarket is just another piece of business property.
It is precisely because the supermarket is not just another business
property that so many slip-and-fall cases occur on its premises. And
it is this same reason that largely accounts for the extreme difficulty
in proving a supermarket slip-and-fall case. Very few, if any, of the
other business properties combine the following:
(1) hard and comparatively slick floors,
(2) push carts,
(3) the same weekly, predominantly female, clientele,
(4) eye-catching displays,
(5) large numbers of small and potentially hazardous items in
open bins,
(6) almost continuous replenishment of products,
(7) customer unassisted handling of products,
(8) relatively high volume of persons on property each day,
(9) well-defined shopping flow,
(10) high proportion of part-time help, and other features that
distinguish the modem self-service supermarket.
Would it not be logical to provide specially for the supermarket
situation?
We have already discussed the viewpoint that supermarkets should
be treated separately and that a higher degree of diligence on the
part of supermarket owners should be required. Whether this higher
degree of diligence should remain within the reasonable care rule
of supermarket liability is a semantic question with which we need
78. Frederich's Mkt., Inc. v. Knox, 66 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1953).
79. Carls Mkts. v. Leonard, 73 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1954).
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not be concerned. Motivating those who advocate a higher-degree-ofdiligence test is undoubtedly the desire to have a more responsible
supermarket and to compensate those, who through no fault of their
own, are injured on a supermarket's premises. The argument is made
that the law has lagged behind in defining the duties of a supermarket owner; and, as a result, valid claims are being denied recovery.
From our study, the law governing supermarket liability can be
criticized for its inconsistency, reliance on chance modes of proof,
and frequent denial of relief without jury consideration. The existing
law would seem to prefer that a sizable number of valid claims
are denied relief than to allow even the possibility that an unjust
claim would sneak through. A rethinking of supermarket liability is
certainly desirable.
Two other solutions to the slip-and-fall problem might be a Shoppers' Compensation Statute or Plan, analogous to Workmen's Compensation, or a Shoppers' Safety Commission modeled after industrial
safety commissions. Both solutions have advantages. The Compensation Statute would provide some recovery for all injured shoppers
while the Safety Commission could do much to eliminate the causes
of the slip and fall. Both have drawbacks, as well, not the least of
which is their novelty.
A more likely solution to the current situation is to shift some
of the burden of proof to the defendant. If this were done, supermarket liability would exist when an injury resulted from a dangerous condition on the premises unless the supermarket should show
that it did not create the dangerous condition and that the condition
did not exist for a sufficient period of time to have been discovered
and remedied. In effect, proof of the existence of the dangerous
condition and proximate causation of plaintiff's injuries would raise
a rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part of the supermarket owner or his employees.
Several advantages would result from placing some of the burden
of proof on the defendant. First, more slip-and-fall cases will be
permitted to reach the jury where the feelings of the public will be
expressed. Second, the burden of proof as to each issue will be upon
the party most capable of producing relevant evidence. Third, with
this in mind, supermarkets will undoubtedly keep better records of
inspections and operating procedures and will probably seek ways
of improving both. Fourth, more of the risk of loss is placed upon
the one better able to bear it, the supermarket.
The defendant will not be presumed into liability if the burden
of proof is shifted. In virtually all cases, unless the defendant's
operating procedures, including inspection, are clearly negligent, the
supermarket should be able at least to reach the jury.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

17

